

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 JERUSALEM 659

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 68

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL--MARCH 6

1. SUMMARY: WE MET WITH KAMEL AFTERNOON MONDAY, MARCH 6, BEFORE CALLING ON SADAT AT 6:00 THAT EVENING. I GAVE KAMEL A RUNDOWN ON MY TALKS IN ISRAEL AND TOLD HIM THAT I HAD A LETTER FOR SADAT FROM BEGIN, IN REPLY TO SADAT'S LETTER. I MADE CLEAR THAT, UNLIKE DEALINGS WE HAD HAD WITH THE EGYPTIANS ON THE SADAT LETTER, ISRAELIS HAD NOT CONSULTED US AND WE HAD HAD NO HAND IN BEGIN'S LETTER, WHICH WE HAD NOT SEEN UNTIL IT WAS DELIVERED TO OUR TEL AVIV EMBASSY IN FINAL FORM EVENING MARCH 5. I ALSO BRIEFED KAMEL ON MY TALKS IN AMMAN. KAMEL WAS VISIBLY DISAPPOINTED BY MY REPORT THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT RESPONDED TO MY REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL INDICATION OF WHAT JORDAN WOULD REQUIRE TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR JORDANIAN

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IDEAS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I STRESSED THAT HUSSEIN HAD EXPRESSED CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S INITIATIVE AND HAD NOT SAID HE WAS REFUSING TO DEAL ON THESE SUBJECTS; HE HAD SIMPLY RESTATED STANDARD JORDANIAN POSITION CALLING FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. HE HAD SAID HE AS READY TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE, AND PERHAPS HE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING FOR US LATER BUT WANTED

TO "WAIT AND SEE." KAMEL AND BOUTROS GHALI WERE ALSO DISCOURAGED BY ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK (I BRIEFED THEM IN GENERAL TERMS ON MY MEETING WITH BARAK ON THIS ISSUE). KAMEL SAID BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON WILL BE A "TURNING POINT." THE PRESIDENT MUST HOLD FIRMLY TO US POSITIONS AND MAKE CLEAR TO BEGIN THAT IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CHANGE ITS VIEWS IT WILL LOSE AMERICAN SUPPORT. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT DRAMATIC CHANGES DURING BEGIN IN WASHINGTON; IN ANY EVENT, HE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN TO ISRAEL AND TALK WITH HIS CABINET BEFORE MAKING DECISIONS. IN THIS REGARD I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC DEBATE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN ISRAEL AND POINTED OUT THAT IT HAD BEEN FOSTERED BY THE FIRM POSITION THAT THE US HAS TAKEN AND BY EGYPTIAN READINESS FOR PEACE. ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, KAMEL FIRST SAID HE WANTED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT BEFORE GIVING ME AN EGYPTIAN TEXT RESPONDING TO ISRAEL'S LATEST TEXT. AFTER EILTS AND I ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD PUT EGYPT IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION AND ENABLE ISRAELIS TO MAINTAIN THAT THE BALL IS IN EGYPT'S COURT AND THAT NOTHING FURTHER IS REQUIRED OF THEM, KAMEL INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO GIVE US SOMETHING IF BEGIN'S LETTER WAS ENCOURAGING. KAMEL SAID THAT, AS SADAT HAD PROMISED, THEY HAD PREPARED A PAPER FOR US ON EGYPTIAN IDEAS FOR INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND WOULD GIVE IT TO US AFTER THEY SEE BEGIN'S REPLY TO SADAT. KAMEL STRESSED THIS WOULD BE FOR US EYES ONLY AND SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED TO OTHERS.

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(SADAT READ AND PASSED ON EGYPTIAN PAPER AT OUR 6:00 PM MEETING, TOGETHER WITH SOME ORAL COMMENTS. PAPER IS BASICALLY RE-STATEMENT OF STANDARD EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY POSITIONS AND DOES NOT ADVANCE MATTERS IN THIS AREA IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY.)
END SUMMARY.

2. MEETING LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AND HALF AND WAS AT KAMEL'S RESIDENCE (HE WAS RECOVERING FROM A BAD CASE OF THE FLU). WITH KAMEL WERE MINISTER OF STATE BOUTROS GHALI AND CHEF DE CABINET AHMED MAHER. ON OUR SIDE WERE EILTS, MYSELF AND KORN.

3. I OPENED BY SAYING THAT I HAD A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO DELIVER TO PRESIDENT SADAT. KAMEL REMARKED THAT HE HAD BEEN READING THE ISRAELI PRESS STORIES CONCERNING SADAT'S LETTER TO BEGIN. IF YOU PUT TOGETHER WHAT HAD APPEARED IN ALL THE DIFFERENT PAPERS, YOU GET MORE OR LESS THE CONTENTS OF SADAT'S LETTER, KAMEL SAID. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THE ISRAELI PRESS STORIES GAVE THE TONE OF THE LETTER BUT NOT THE SUBSTANCE. KAMEL AGREED.

4. KAMEL ASKED ABOUT THE POSTPONEMENT OF MY VISIT TO SAUDI

ARABIA. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD FIRST HAD WORD IN AMMAN THAT SAUD WAS EXPECTED BACK LATE MARCH 6 AND THAT A MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED WITH HIM. SUBSEQUENTLY WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT SAUD HAD A SMALL MEDICAL PROBLEM AND WOULD BE STAYING ON IN SWITZERLAND FOR A WHILE. KAMEL ASKED IF THE POSTPONEMENT OF MY TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA HAD "ANYTHING TO DO WITH SYRIAN ATTITUDE"? I EMPHASIZED THAT THE LAST WORD I HAD RECEIVED FROM THE SAUDIS WAS THAT I WAS WELCOME TO COME, BUT I DID NOT SEE THE UTILITY OF GOING UNLESS I COULD MEET SAUD OR OTHER SENIOR FIGURES. KAMEL WAS OBVIOUSLY WONDERING WHETHER THE SAUDIS WERE SEEKING TO AVOID A MEETING.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 JERUSALEM 659

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 68

5. I THEN GAVE KAMEL A RUNDOWN ON MY LATEST ROUND OF TALKS IN ISRAEL. I SAID I HAD MET WITH DAYAN AND GONE OVER THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. I HAD ALSO MET WITH BEGIN AND HAD DELIVERED SADAT'S MESSAGE. I EMPHASIZED THAT I HAD DELIVERED SADAT'S LETTER TO BEGIN PRIVATELY, WITH ONLY BEGIN AND DAYAN PRESENT, AND HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO KEEP THE CONTENTS CONFIDENTIAL. WITH BOTH DAYAN AND BEGIN I HAD AGAIN MADE THE POINT CONCERNING THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE IS THE MINIMUM THAT WOULD BE REASONABLE. I SAID I HAD ALSO STRONGLY REITERATED OUR POSITION REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL PORTION OF RESOLUTION 242 TO ALL FRONTS. I SAID I HAD HAD A SPECIAL

MEETING WITH BARAK AND ROSENNE TO CONVEY OUR LEGAL POSITION
ON THIS ISSUE.

6. I SAID DURING MY DISCUSSIONS WITH DAYAN CONCERNING THE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES DAYAN HAD ASKED IF I COULD EXPLAIN
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HOW EGYPT INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE ASWAN FORMULA. DAYAN HAD ASKED IF
I COULD GET CLARIFICATION IN THIS FROM KAMEL. I SAID DAYAN
HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HIS REQUEST DID NOT MEAN THAT HE ACCEPTED
THE PHRASE, BUT HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT IT MEANT. I WAS
PASSING THIS ON TO KAMEL AS SOMETHING HE MIGHT REFLECT ON.
I SAID I HAD TOLD DAYAN THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS QUITE CLEAR
THAT THE TERM "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" IN EGYPTIAN EYES WAS NOT
MEANT TO NULIFY OR INFRINGE UPON ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST,
AS IT HAD OFTEN IMPLIED IN EARLIER YEARS. KAMEL SAID THAT IS
ENTIRELY CORRECT, WE ACCEPT ISRAEL WITHIN ITS 1967 BORDERS.
I SAID AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME I WOULD BE GLAD TO CONVEY TO
DAYAN ANY CLARIFICATIONS KAMEL WISHED. I COULD OF COURSE NOT
GUARANTEE THAT WHATEVER KAMEL PASSED TO DAYAN WOULD NOT
LEAK OUT, AND THAT WOULD BE A FACTOR TO KEEP IN MIND. KAMEL
REMARKED THAT "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINIANS WAS,
IN EGYPT'S VIEW, LINKED WITH SELF-DETERMINATION. "THE TWO
GO TOGETHER," HE ADDED. KAMEL DID NOT FURTHER ELUCIDATE.
HE DID RECALL, HOWEVER, THAT SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM HAD SPOKEN
OF "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" AS ENCOMPASSING HUMAN RIGHTS.

7. I SAID PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE
TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S LETTER BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS A RENEWAL
OF DIRECT CONTACT; I NOTED THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY THE POINT
THAT SADAT HIMSELF HAD MADE. I SAID I HAD JUST RECEIVED BEGIN'S
REPLY TO SADAT THIS MORNING. I WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT WE
WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF BEGIN'S LETTER.
WE HAD NO HAND IN IT AND HAD NOT SEEN IT BEFORE IT WAS GIVEN
IN FINAL FORM TO OUR EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV LAST NIGHT. I ADDED
THAT IN MY PERSONAL VIEW THIS EXCHANGE BETWEEN SADAT AND
BEGIN WAS USEFUL EVEN IF THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO MEN WERE
QUITE DIFFERENT. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT SADAT'S ACTION IN SENDING
THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO EGYPT IN US PUBLIC OPINION
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AND HELPFUL IN FURTHERING THE PROCESS OF RETHINKING GOING
ON IN ISRAEL.

8. REGARDING MY MEETING WITH BARAK, I SAID BARAK HAD NOT CON-

TESTED THE FACTS I HAD CITED CONCERNING NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF RESOLUTION 242 AND DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD INDICATED ACCEPTANCE OF OUR INTERPRETATION THAT RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS. ESSENTIALLY BARAK'S LEGAL POSITION WAS BASED ON THE ARGUMENT THAT SINCE THE TEXT OF 242 DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY WITHDRAWAL MUST BE ON ALL FRONTS, ISRAEL HAS A RIGHT TO INTERPRET IT AS NOT REQUIRING WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS. I POINTED OUT THAT WHAT BARAK WAS IN FACT DOING WAS MAKING A LEGAL CASE FOR A PRECONCEIVED POLITICAL POSITION. KAMEL SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT ALLON HAD CONTESTED THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD ASKED FOR DEBATE ON IT IN THE KNESSET. I POINTED OUT THAT EBAN HAD WRITTEN AN ARTICLE RECENTLY IN THE JERUSALEM POST SAYING THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THAT 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS. KAMEL SAID HE WAS VERY HAPPY THAT BEGIN'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER WAS CONTESTED IN ISRAEL. HE ADDED "WE WILL SEE HOW BEGIN'S VISIT TO THE STATES GOES." I SAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 242 WILL BE A MAJOR ITEM ON THE AGENDA FOR BEGIN'S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. KAMEL ASKED HOW THE OPPOSITION IN ISRAEL VIEWS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. I SAID ALMOST EVERYBODY IN ISRAEL OPPOSES THE IDEA OF INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, BUT THERE IS A DEFINITE DIVISION OF OPINION ON THE QUESTION OF THE LANGUAGE THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. SOME MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION HAVE LESS OF A PROBLEM CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S ASWAN LANGUAGE THAN DOES BEGIN. BUT ALMOST ALL HAVE SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS," WITH ITS CONNOTATION OF THE US SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT.

9. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF FERMENT GOING
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ON IN ISRAEL AND THAT THE DEBATE HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON ISRAEL PUBLIC OPINION. KAMEL ASKED IF THE DEBATE IS HAVING AN IMPACT ON BEGIN. I SAID I THOUGHT IT WAS CERTAINLY HAVING SOME EFFECT BUT IT IS HARD TO SAY PRECISELY TO WHAT EXTENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET IS DIVIDED ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, MOST PROMINENTLY THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE. KAMEL SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTRY HAD DENIED THAT WEIZMAN HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO REMOVE ONE OF THE SETTLEMENTS (PRESUMABLY THIS CONCERNS THE KADESH BARNEA CASE). OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED, KAMEL ASKED "WHY DID THEY ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT?" I SAID I HAD NOT HEARD OF THIS BUT I DID KNOW THAT WEIZMAN WAS THE LEADING FIGURE IN THE MOVE WHICH LED TO THE LATEST ISRAELI CABINET DECISION WHICH PUT A PARTIAL FREEZE ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. I POINTED OUT FURTHER THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE STRONG POSITION TAKEN BY THE USG, IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE MADE

ANY MOVE TO LIMIT ALREADY PLANNED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 JERUSALEM 0659

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 68

10. I THEN WENT OVER WITH KAMEL OUR REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNING THE WEST BANK CONTAINED IN STATE 56183. I READ KAMEL PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT'S MESSAGE, INCLUDING THE CITATIONS OF THE BERNADETTE REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1948, AND STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY MARSHALL AND BY JESSEP, AND SECRETARY ACHESON'S APRIL 26, 1950 STATEMENT. I SAID THAT THE RECORD SEEMS TO SHOW THAT IN THE 1948-50 PERIOD THE USG HAD ALTERNATED BETWEEN ACCEPTING AND NOT ACCEPTING JORDANIAN ANNEXATION. FINALLY WE HAD TAKEN A MIDDLE POSITION. I CITED THE POSITION WE HAD TAKEN ON APRIL 26, 1950, IN REPLYING TO A BRITISH EMBASSY INQUIRY IN WHICH WE HAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH "WE FAVORED THE INCLUSION OF CENTRAL PALESTINE IN JORDAN AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME," WE FELT THAT "UNILATERAL ACTION TO THAT EFFECT BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS OF SUCH CHARACTER AS TO MAKE IT
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DIFFICULT FOR US TO ANNOUNCE OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC APPROBATION." KAMEL SAID IF HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY QUESTION OF UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK. I SAID THAT IS CORRECT. OBVIOUSLY KAMEL ATTACHED SOME IMPORTANCE TO THIS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT IN THE LATE 1940'S THE U.S. HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE THEIR OWN STATE.

11. I THEN GAVE A BRIEF RUNDOWN ON MY TALKS IN AMMAN. I HAD TOLD HUSSEIN WE WERE NOT PRESSING HIM FOR A COMMITMENT TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS STAGE BUT THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR US TO KNOW FOR OUR INFORMATION WHAT HE CONSIDERED A NECESSARY BASIS FOR JOINING, AND ALSO TO HAVE HIS IDEAS ON FUTURE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I SAID HUSSEIN HAD RECEIVED ME VERY CORDIALLY BUT HE WAS NOT WILLING TO BE DRAWN OUT ON SPECIFICS AND WOULD NOT GIVE ME MUCH IN RESPONSE TO EITHER OF MY QUESTIONS. IN EFFECT HE HAD RESTATED THE JORDANIAN POSITION THAT ISRAEL MUST AGREE IN ADVANCE TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND FULL SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. WHAT HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING WAS THAT BEFORE HE ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS HE WANTED TO KNOW WHERE THEY WOULD COME OUT.

12. I SAID I HAD TOLD HUSSEIN THAT I DID NOT THINK HE COULD GET ANYTHING AS SPECIFIC AS HE WAS ASKING IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS. I HAD URGED HIM TO BE REALISTIC AND KEEP AN OPEN MIND ABOUT JOINING THE TALKS, IF WE COULD GET FROM ISRAEL AN UNDERSTANDING THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF RESOLUTION 242 AND THEREFORE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL. I HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WE HOPED THAT THAT, COUPLED WITH OUR OWN

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ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVING, WOULD BE ENOUGH. HUSSEIN HAD NOT SAID EITHER YES OR NO. HE WANTED TO WAIT AND SEE WHERE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WOULD LEAD BEFORE MAKING A DECISION. HUSSEIN HAD, HOWEVER, REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT SADAT'S INITIATIVE WOULD SUCCEED. I SAID I HAD ALSO SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN TO GIVE HIS IDEAS DIRECTLY TO THE EGYPTIANS. KAMEL ASKED IF NOTHING HAD COME OUT REGARDING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON THE WEST BANK? "NOTHING?" I SAID IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HUSSEIN WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. HE ACCEPTS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE TO A FINAL SOLUTION IN ONE JUMP AND THAT THERE MUST BE AN INTERIM REGIME. BUT HE DID NOT GIVE ME SPECIFICS. I

EMPHASIZED THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT SAID HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE US WITH IDEAS; HE SIMPLY INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TTO TO SO AT THIS TIME. I WAS SURE HE WOULD BE THINKING ABOUT THE QUESTION, AND PERHAPS THE JORDANIANS WILL BE READY FOR DISCUSSIONS ON MY NEXT TRIP TO JORDAN. KAMEL ASKED IF THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM HAD ARISEN IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH HUSSEIN. I SAID NOT DIRECTLY, ONLY IN THE SENSE THAT HUSSEIN HAD CALLED FOR TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. KAMEL ASKED IF THE PLO HAD OME UP AND I REPLIED IT HAD NOT. KAMEL ASKED HOW MY CONVERSATION WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAD GONE. I SAID HASSAN SEEMED SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE. HE APPEARED TO BE GROPING FOR WAYS IN WHICH JORDAN MIGHT RESPOND AND HELP MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD BUT HE DID NOT OFFER ANYTHING SPECIFIC.

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 68

13. THE NEWS THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT ACCEDED TO MY REQUEST FOR SPECIFICS ON JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS OR ITS IDEAS CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS OBVIOUSLY DISCOURAGING TO KAMEL. HE ASKED WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF DOING NEXT. I SAID WE ARE FOCUSING ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, AND BOTH EILTS AND I STRESSED THAT WE THOUGHT WHATEVER NEXT STEPS ARE TAKEN WE

THOUGHT THAT SHOULD BE BASED ON WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR. KAMEL SAID "THINGS WILL BE CLEAR AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD THE FEELING THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR BEGIN TO CHANGE HIS IDEAS. KAMEL PROBED WHETHER WE HAD GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO IDEA THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE MOVED TO ANOTHER FORUM -- E.G., WALDHEIM'S NEW YORK IDEA (HE DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER ON THIS). ELITS POINTED OUT THAT THE PROBLEM, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS EVER MOVE INTO ANOTHER FORUM, IS TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF
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WHATEVER HAS BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, IN ORDER TO PROTECT SADAT, AND NOT TO APPEAR TO BE CHANGING VENUES BECAUSE SADAT HAS FAILED. KAMEL QUICKLY GOT THE POINT BUT ASKED WHAT WILL PROTECT SADAT IF BEGIN CONTINUES HIS PRESENT POLICIES. KAMEL THEN REMARKED THAT "THE MORE YOU CHASE HUSSEIN, THE MORE ELUSIVE HE IS." KAMEL ASKED WHETHER HUSSEIN WOULD BE VISITING THE U.S.; HE SAID HE HAD SEEN A REPORT THAT HUSSEIN WOULD BE GOING TO WASHINGTON SHORTLY AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT. I SAID THERE WAS NOTHING PLANNED FOR SUCH AN EARLY TIME AND NOTHING SPECIFIC AT ALL. WE HAD HAD SOME INDICATIONS THAT HUSSEIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT A PRIVATE VISIT, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION BETWEEN US ON THIS AND I DID NOT EXPECT HUSSEIN WOULD GO TO THE U.S. RIGHT AWAY. I THOUGHT THE PROSPECT OF A VISIT BY HUSSEIN WOULD DEPEND TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE SITUATION, AND OF COURSE ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE.

14. I NOTED THAT BEGIN'S VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK. LOOKING AHEAD, ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES AFTER THAT WILL BE TO IRON OUT THE DIFFERENCE IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, PARTICULARLY THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT BEGIN COULD MAKE BASIC CHANGES IN ISRAEL'S POSITION WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON. IN ANY EVENT, HE WILL HAVE TO GO BACK TO ISRAEL AND CONSULT WITH HIS CABINET. I ADDED THAT I THOUGHT THAT MY MISSION HAD LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS THAT BEGIN WILL HAVE IN WASHINGTON ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, ON THE QUESTION OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF 242 AND GAZA. WHILE OF COURSE WE DID NOT COMPLETE THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES I THOUGHT ADVANCES HAD BEEN MADE. WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CLARIFY AND NARROW THE GAP ON LANGUAGE IN A NUMBER OF CASES. I SAID THAT AT SOME POINT AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT THE PRESIDENT AND THE
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SECRETARY MAY ASK ME TO COME BACK TO THE AREA TO CONTINUE WORK ON THE DECLARATION AND ON WEST BANK/GAZA INTERIM ARRANGMENTS.

15. THERE ENSUED AN EXCHANGE IN WHICH BOTH KAMEL AND BOUTROS GHALI EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION CONCERNING BEGIN'S POSITION THAT 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO ALL FRONTS. "HOW CAN WE SOLVE THIS?" KAMEL ASKED. THE STAND THAT BEGIN HAS TAKEN ON THIS ISSUE, KAMEL SAID, MAKES IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE QUITE CAREFUL REGARDING LANGUAGE IN THE FUTURE; WE MIGHT NEED TO REVIEW THE DECLARATION IN THIS LIGHT. GHALI ARGUED THAT IT WAS A CONTRADICTION TO CLAIM THAT THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS ON THE DECLARATION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEGIN MAINTAINS THE POSITION THAT WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK. I SAID WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 242 VERY CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS, AND THIS HAS BECOME ONE OF THE CENTRAL POINTS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. GHALI SAID HE HAD MET FOR TWO HOURS THE PREVIOUS EVENING WITH URI AVNERI AND HAD COME AWAY DEPRESSED. AVNERI HAD BEEN VERY PESSIMISTIC. HE DID NOT THINK BEGIN WOULD CHANGE HIS POSITION. BOTH GHALI AND KAMEL WANTED TO KNOW HOW WE COULD HOPE TO SUCCEED IN SUCH CASE. I POINTED OUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THEMSELVES IS A CENTRAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITIONS. GHALI SAID HE HAD BEEN SAYING THE SAME THING TO THE PRESS, BUT HE WAS DISCOURAGED NOW TO SEE "NEW OBSTACLES ARE ARISING."

16. KAMEL SAID THE BEGIN VISIT COULD BE "THE TURNING POINT." HE HOPED THE UNITED STATES WOULD "STICK TO AMERICAN POSITION." I REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT DRAMATIC OR MIRACULOUS DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE BEGIN VISIT. KAMEL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS BUT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE "100 PERCENT" FIRM ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO BEGIN THAT UNLESS HE

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CHANGES HIS POSITION ISRAEL WILL LOSE THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. KAMEL FELT THAT IF THE PRESIDENT GETS THIS POINT ACROSS, THE ISRAELI PUBLIC WILL RECONSIDER ITS POSITION. THE ISRAELIS NOW THINK THEY CAN STAY WHERE THEY ARE AND STILL HAVE U.S. SUPPORT. THEY MUST BE DISABUSED OF THIS. BEGIN MUST NOT BE ALLOWED "TO HAVE HIS CRAZY DREAMS," KAMEL SAID.

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FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 68

17. I ASKED IF KAMEL HAD ANYTHING FOR ME TO TAKE BACK TO JERUSALEM ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. "NOT REALLY," KAMEL REPLIED. I NOTED THAT I HAD TOLD DAYAN THAT KAMEL WAS CONSIDERING THE LATEST ISRAELI DRAFT AND MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING IN WRITING FOR ME TO TAKE BACK TO JERUSALEM. KAMEL REFERRED TO THE CLAUSE ON THE "INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR" AND SAID THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT MOVED ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. KAMEL SAID HE THOUGHT "WE MUST WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT" BEFORE PROVIDING ANYTHING FURTHER ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. EILTS AND I POINTED OUT THAT EGYPT'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE LATEST ISRAELI DRAFT WILL ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO SAY THE BALL IS IN THE EGYPTIAN COURT. THEY WILL MAINTAIN THAT IT IS UP TO EGYPT, NOT ISRAEL, TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE. KAMEL SEEMED TO SOFTEN SOMEWHAT UNDER THE IMPACT OF THIS ARGUMENT. HE SAID LET'S SEE WHAT BEGIN SAYS IN HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT AND THEN WE WILL CONSIDER
SECRET

SECRET

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WHETHER WE SHOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS ANYTHING FURTHER.

18. EILTS ASKED IF KAMEL WAS GOING TO GIVE ME THE PAPER ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THAT SADAT HAD MENTIONED DURING OUR LAST MEETING. KAMEL SAID EGYPTIANS HAD PREPARED SOMETHING

AND WOULD GIVE IT TO US AFTER WE SAW SADAT. SINCE THE TIME
FOR A MEETING WITH SADAT HAD NOT YET BEEN SET, KAMEL THEN LEFT
THE ROOM TO TELEPHONE SADAT. HE RETURNED A FEW MINUTES LATER
AND SAID OUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN SET FOR 6:00
PM.
NEWLIN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, MEETING REPORTS, MEETINGS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
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From: JERUSALEM
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Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
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Message ID: 8ad232cc-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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SAS ID: 3420385
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Subject: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL--MARCH 6
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US, IS, (KAMEL)
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Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8ad232cc-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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